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Abstract—We study the role of a market maker (or market
operator) in a transmission constrained electricity market. We
model the market as a one-shot networked Cournot competition
where generators supply quantity bids and load serving entities
provide downward sloping inverse demand functions. This
mimics the operation of a spot market in a deregulated market
structure. In this paper, we focus on possible mechanisms
employed by the market maker to balance demand and supply.
In particular, we consider three candidate objective functions
that the market maker optimizes – social welfare, residual social
welfare, and consumer surplus. We characterize the existence
of Generalized Nash Equilibrium (GNE) in this setting and
demonstrate that market outcomes at equilibrium can be very
different under the candidate objective functions.
Index Terms—Cournot equilibrium, electricity markets.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the 1990s, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) began to deregulate electricity markets in vari-
ous states by replacing cost-of-service regulated rates with
market-based prices. The goal was to increase competition
among generators and lower prices to end-consumers. How-
ever, the consequences of deregulation were unexpected; in
2000 and 2001, market manipulations led to the California
electricity crisis which involved multiple large-scale black-
outs and skyrocketing prices [29]. It is estimated that about
$5.55 billion was paid in excess of costs between 1998
and 2001 alone [5]. Subsequently, various measures were
introduced in the markets to curb such behavior. Neverthe-
less, market manipulation continues to exist. For instance,
JP Morgan was fined $410 million for market manipulation
in electricity markets in California and the Midwest from
September 2010 to November 2012 [13]. Clearly, market
power remains a major issue in electricity markets today.
One reason for this is that electricity markets are complex
and operate on multiple time-scales. Power delivered at
a particular instant of time is first procured months (or
even years) ahead via long-term bilateral contracts between
generators and retailers. Between one week and one day
ahead of delivery, generators and retailers begin to trade
in centralized electricity markets to clear imbalances. These
centralized markets typically operate over multiple stages to
allow market participants to exploit the increased information
about supply and demand closer to delivery. The procedures
for each stage are similar – generators and retailers submit
offers and bids respectively and the market operator clears the
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market by solving a centralized dispatch problem to minimize
system costs subject to operating constraints. Payments are
calculated based on locational marginal prices (LMP) which
are designed to reflect local costs of generation. Clearly,
the market clearing mechanism employed by the market
operator has a significant impact on the incentives and
bidding behavior of market participants.
Our goal in this paper is to study the role of the market
maker (or market operator) on the efficiency of electricity
markets. In particular, we study the impact of the market
clearing rule on the strategic incentives of generators. We
formulate a competitive model between multiple generators
and a single market maker on a power network. We model the
bidding behavior of the generators using a networked Cournot
model and we assume that the market maker clears the market
to optimize a specific regulatory objective subject to the
DC power flow equations and line constraints. In particular,
we consider three natural market maker objectives – social
welfare, residual social welfare, and consumer surplus. The
social welfare is the consumers’ utility less the costs of
generation; the residual social welfare is the consumers’
utility less the revenue of generators; and the consumer
surplus is the consumers’ utility less their payment. Note
that residual social welfare is not necessarily equal to the
consumer surplus since electricity markets are not necessarily
budget balanced. The latter is a byproduct of nodal pricing
– generators receive local prices which might be different
from the price at the remote location where their power is
delivered.
A. Contributions of this paper
We make two main contributions: (i) we characterize the
existence of equilibria under each of the three market maker
objectives, and (ii) we show that, when equilibria exists,
the equilibrium flow could be completely different under
the three objectives. Our results highlight the importance
of designing the market in a way that takes into account
strategic generator behavior and physical system constraints.
The equilibrium concept we adopt in this paper is known
as Generalized Nash Equilibrium (GNE). As will be clear
in Section II, the strategy set of the market maker depends
on the actions of generators, and so the conventional Nash
equilibrium framework does not apply to our setting. Hence,
we resort to GNE which is an extension of Nash equilibrium
for such settings.
Our first main result is that a GNE always exists under
the social welfare and residual social welfare objectives but
it might not exist under the consumer surplus objective.
For the latter, we provide a simple 2-node example under
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which GNE does not exist. Our proof shows that one of the
key factors that leads to non-existence of GNE is that the
consumer surplus is not a concave function of the market
maker’s decision variable. Non-existence of equilibria could
have numerous negative implications on market efficiency,
e.g. more volatile prices leading to higher risk premium that
eventually translates into higher costs for consumers. Also,
market power measures might need to be adjusted to use
longer-term metrics in order to account for the unreliable
observations of market outcomes (e.g. see [6]).
Our second main result shows that, when equilibria exists,
the market outcomes could differ significantly under the
three regulatory objectives. In particular, we focus on a 2-
node example and show that the equilibrium flow could be
positive with social welfare maximization, zero with residual
social welfare maximization, and negative with consumer
surplus maximization. Hence, although all three regulatory
objectives attempt to maximize consumer benefit, the exact
methodology by which system costs are reflected in the
objective impacts how generators behave in the market and
determines the resulting equilibrium and system efficiency.
B. Related literature
Electricity markets are challenging to model and analyze
due to the multiple time-scales, non-convex generation costs,
network constraints and generation supply constraints. Nev-
ertheless, there is a sizable literature focused on analyzing
the key strategic incentives of generators. The models that
have been used can be largely classified into two categories
– supply function competition and Cournot competition. In
both approaches, it is common to assume that demand is
exogenous and focus on analyzing the resulting strategic
game among generators. Here, we briefly review prior work
using supply function and Cournot competition in single-
stage settings. We recognize that there is also significant work
in multi-stage models, but we do not discuss that here as
forward contracting is not the focus of the current paper.
Supply function competition: Introduced by Klemperer et
al. in [20], the key feature of supply function competition
is that firms (or generators) compete by choosing supply
functions specifying how much power it is willing to supply
at each price. This model is appealing due to its similarity to
how electricity markets operate in practice where generators
typically submit step-wise increasing offer functions. Hence,
this model has been frequently used both analytically and
numerically to obtain insights on generator behavior [1], [2],
[7], [8], [14], [15], [26]. In certain cases, strong theoretical
results were obtained by restricting the functional form of
the supply functions to a parameterized class [1], [14], [19],
[26] (typically affine or logarithmic). More recent work
has analyzed supply function competition in settings with
network transmission constraints [37], [39], [40]. However,
to our knowledge, no work has addressed the role of the
market maker under supply function competition.
Cournot competition: Cournot competition is a well-known
competitive model in economics dating back to 1838 [22],
[32]. In contrast with the supply function approach where
generators submit an offer function, in Cournot competition,
generators submit a single quantity specifying how much they
are willing to supply at any price. Hence, this formulation
amounts to generators specifying a supply function with zero
price elasticity. Although this offer model is significantly
different from how electricity markets operate in practice,
it was found that the Cournot model often provides good
explanations of observed price variations [33], [36]. Further,
the Cournot model is appealing due to its tractability, e.g.
bounds on the loss in system efficiency due to strategic
behavior have been obtained [18], [30], [31].
Networked Cournot competition: Cournot competition has
also been applied to settings with network transmission
constraints [3], [4], [23], [35], [41]–[43]. Such frameworks
have also been applied to domains outside electricity within
a broader framework referred to as networked Cournot com-
petition [17]. However, the results in [17] are not directly
applicable to electricity markets because they ignore network
flow constraints. To our knowledge, in both non-networked
and networked Cournot competition, no work has studied
the role of the market maker which is the main focus of this
paper.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Our goal in this paper is to understand how the decision
of the market maker impacts the strategic incentives and the
resulting market equilibrium of generators in an electricity
market. Hence, we model the market as a game between two
entities: generators located at different nodes of the network,
and a market maker that balances demand and supply. Since
nodal pricing is a key feature in many electricity markets, we
seek to capture this feature in our model by having generators
and demand face different prices depending on their location
in the network.
A. Notation
Let R denote the set of real numbers and R+ denote the
set of non-negative real numbers. For any two vectors u, v of
the same size, we say u ≥ v if the vector u− v is element-
wise non-negative. Also, let 1 denote the vector of all ones of
appropriate size. For any vector v ∈ Rn, we denote its trans-
pose by v>. We also let v−i = (v1, . . . , vi−1, vi+1, . . . , vn)
denote the vector of all elements other than the i-th element.
B. Network model
We consider a power network with n nodes 1, 2, . . . , n
and ` edges. Each node k has a generator Gk that supplies
a quantity of power qk ≥ 0 and incurs a cost ckq2k for some
ck > 0. We assume that demand at each node k can be
represented by a linear demand function:
pk(dk) := ak − bkdk,
for some ak > 0 and bk ≥ 0. Here, pk(dk) is the price
that demand at node k is willing to pay as a function of
the quantity of power dk it receives. This form of demand
function is a common assumption in economics [32] and
prior studies of electricity markets models [41]–[43] and
corresponds to an aggregate consumer having a quadratic
utility function. We also assume that all demand functions
are fixed and known to all market participants, which is
reasonable when demand is highly predictable.
We assume that there is a single market maker M that
balances supply and demand by choosing re-balancing quan-
tities rk at each node such that demand at node k receives a
quantity:
dk := qk + rk.
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At each node k, the market maker charges the demand and
pays the generator at a price pk(qk+rk). This model for nodal
pricing is motivated by prior studies of electricity markets,
e.g. [41]–[43].
Let the vector q := (q1, q2, . . . , qn) denote the pro-
duction quantities of the generators and the vector r :=
(r1, r2, . . . , rn) denote the re-balancing quantities chosen by
the market maker. We assume that the market maker chooses
the vector r of re-balancing quantities subject to the following
constraints:
(i) Demand at each node is non-negative, i.e., q + r ≥ 0.
(ii) Power flow on each transmission line respects the line
limits, i.e., −f ≤ −Hr ≤ f , where H ∈ R`×n is the
shift-factor matrix that relates the flows on all ` lines as
a function of the power injection vector −r and f ∈ R`
is the vector of all line capacities.
(iii) Re-balancing quantities sum to zero, i.e., 1> r = 0.
Note that the set of allowable re-balancing quantities
depends on the production quantities q. We denote the set
of allowable re-balancing quantities by:
SM (q) :=
{
r ∈ Rn ∣∣ q + r ≥ 0, |Hr| ≤ f,1> r = 0 }.
Figure 1 shows an example of a 2-node network, which we
study in detail in Section IV.
We remark that the shift-factor matrix depends on the
admittances of the transmission lines of the power network
and encapsulates Kirchoff’s laws [27]. This representation
assumes a linearized DC power-flow model [25] for the
network. Though widely used in the literature, this repre-
sentation of the power flow equations has its limitations for
power system operation, e.g., see [28]. However, in electricity
markets, locational marginal prices are typically calculated
using the DC power-flow model [9], [21], [24]. Hence, this
is a reasonable model for the purpose of studying generator
bidding behavior in the market.
C. Generator profit
Within the context described above, the profit of generator
Gk is given by:
piGk (qk, q−k, r) := qkpk(qk + rk)− ckq2k. (4)
We assume that each generator seeks to maximize its
profit piGk (qk, q−k, r) over its production quantity qk ∈ SGk
where SGk = R+ denotes the set of allowable production
quantities of generator k. That is, we assume that generators
have infinite capacities.
This is a common assumption in prior studies of market
power [14], [15]. The analysis of the case of finite generation
capacities is clearly important, but it is left for future work.
Notice that, without the strategic market-maker and ge-
ographically distributed generators, this model reduces to
the standard Cournot oligopoly in the microeconomics lit-
erature [22], [32].
D. Market maker objectives
Our focus in this paper is on the role of the market maker.
In electricity markets, the market makers are often regulatory
authorities, e.g., ISOs; thus our goal is to study the role of
market design in this regulatory framework.
The market maker designs we consider assume that the
market maker maximizes some objective function piM (q, r)
over the re-balancing quantities r ∈ SM (q). Note that the
market maker is a regulatory authority and is free to choose
a suitable payoff function. This is the market design question
of interest, and in this paper we analyze different candidates
for the payoff function piM (q, r).
Specifically, inspired from the microeconomics litera-
ture [22], [32], we consider the following candidates for
piM (q, r):
(a) Social welfare: This is the net benefit to society. It
refers to the consumers’ utility less generation costs
(also referred to as overall network utility). We denote
it by Wsoc(q, r) in (1). If generators are not strategic,
this corresponds to the original optimal power flow
formulation in [10].
(b) Residual social welfare: In practice, generator costs are
unlikely to be known to the market maker. Hence,
an alternative regulatory objective is to maximize the
social welfare, less the profits of the generators. This
is equivalent to the consumers’ utility less the revenue
of the generators. We denote it by Wres(q, r) in (2).
(c) Consumer surplus: This is the net benefit to consumers.
It refers to the consumers’ utility less their payments. We
denote it by Wcon(q, r) in (3).
We remark that at each node k, the amount paid by the
consumers is (qk + rk)pk(qk + rk), and the amount paid
to the generator Gk is qkpk(qk + rk). Hence, the market
is not necessarily budget-balanced. The difference between
the total payment by demand and the total revenue of the
generators has previously been referred to as merchandising
surplus [38]. A consequence of the market not being always
budget-balanced is that the residual social welfare is not
necessarily equal to the consumer surplus. Hence, it is
important to explore the impact of both objectives on the
market.
E. Competitive model
Given the models of the generators and the market maker,
we now need to model their interaction. To do this, we
consider a game with: (a) players (G1, G2, . . . , Gn,M);
(b) strategy sets (SG1 , S
G
2 , . . . , S
G
n , S
M ); and (c) payoffs
(piG1 , pi
G
2 , . . . , pi
G
n , pi
M ), where piM is chosen to be one of the
functions in {Wsoc,Wres,Wcon}. Throughout, we assume
that the game is feasible, i.e., the set {(q ∈ Rn+, r ∈
Rn) | (q, r) ∈ (SGk , 1 ≤ k ≤ n, SM (q))} is non-empty.
Since the strategy set SM (q) of the market-maker depends
on the actions q of the generators, we focus on a type of
equilibrium known as Generalized Nash Equilibria (GNE).
Formally, an action profile (q∗, r∗) constitutes a GNE if, for
each 1 ≤ k ≤ n, we have:
piGk (q
∗
k, q
∗
−k, r
∗) ≥ piGk (qk, q∗−k, r∗) for all qk ∈ SGk ,
piM (q∗, r∗) ≥ piM (q∗, r) for all r ∈ SM (q∗).
This equilibrium concept was first introduced in 1952 by
Debreu [11]. It is an extension of Nash equilibrium where
the strategy sets of players do not depend on the actions of
the other players. We refer the reader to [12] for a detailed
survey.
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Wsoc(q, r) :=
∑
1≤k≤n
(∫ qk+rk
0
pk(wk)dwk − c˜k(qk)
)
. (1)
Wres(q, r) := Wsoc(q, r)−
∑
1≤k≤n
piGk (q, r) =
∑
1≤k≤n
(∫ qk+rk
0
pk(wk)dwk − qkpk(qk + rk)
)
. (2)
Wcon(r, q) :=
∑
1≤k≤n
(∫ qk+rk
0
pk(wk)dwk − (qk + rk)pk(qk + rk)
)
. (3)
Capacity =
f
12
2
q2
q2 + r2
G2
1
q1
q1 + r1
G1
Fig. 1: Example of a 2-node network. This example illustrates
how the model in this paper can be used to study a caricature
of the market in California. Here, northern and southern
California are represented as two aggregate nodes connected
by a transmission line - Path 15 - that is often congested [34].
III. EXISTENCE OF EQUILIBRIUM
Within the context of the model described in the previous
question, we seek to investigate the following two questions
in this paper:
1. Does a GNE always exist for every each of the mar-
ket maker objectives we have described, i.e., piM ∈
{Wsoc,Wres,Wcon}?
2. In the cases where a GNE exists, how do the market
outcomes (in terms of flows, profits of generators and
social welfare) differ for different market maker objec-
tives?
We focus on the first question in this section and treat the
second question in Section IV.
The following is our main result on the existence of GNE.
Theorem 1. A GNE exists if piM = Wsoc or piM = Wres.
However, a GNE may not exist if piM = Wcon.
The theorem shows that the market maker objective has a
significant impact on the existence of a GNE in the market.
One of the key factors that lead to non-existence of GNE is
that the consumer surplus Wcon is not a concave function
of the re-balancing quantities r. Hence, when piM = Wres,
the optimal re-balancing quantities are at the boundaries of
the feasible set SM (q). When the generator production q
changes, the optimal re-balancing quantities r∗ could jump
from one boundary point to another, i.e. it is not always con-
tinuous in q, especially when network capacity constraints are
binding. Hence, there does not necessarily exist a fixed-point
in (q, r). In the proof, we explicitly construct an example that
exhibits this phenomena using the 2-node network in Fig. 1.
Given Theorem 1, let us briefly emphasize the importance
of choosing a regulatory objective that leads to existence of
equilibria. Non-existence of equilibria could have numerous
negative implications. It could lead to volatile market prices
as the market oscillates between different outcomes which
would increase the risk premium and the cost of forward
contracting. Market power measures might need to be ad-
justed to use longer-term metrics in order to account for the
unreliable observations of market outcomes (e.g. see [6]).
Further, more sophisticated models and equilibria concepts
(e.g. repeated game models, dynamic equilibria) might have
to be used in theoretical and empirical analysis of market
behavior.
To prove the existence results in Theorem 1, we use a result
that can be traced back to Debreu [11]. However, the version
we apply is a slightly simplified statement given in [12], [16].
Below, we state Debreu’s theorem before giving a proof of
Theorem 1.
Theorem. (Debreu [11]) Consider a game between N play-
ers defined as follows. For each player ν, denote its action
by xν ∈ Rnν and its payoff function by θν : Rn → R where
n =
∑N
ν=1 nν . Assume that each player ν has a strategy set
Xν(x−ν) ⊆ Rnν that could depend on the actions x−ν of
all other players. Hence, given the actions x−ν of all other
players, each player ν chooses a strategy xν that solves:
max
xν∈Xν(x−ν)
θν(xν , x−ν).
Suppose that:
1) There exists N nonempty, convex and compact sets
Kν ⊂ Rnν such that for every x ∈ Rn with xν ∈ Kν
for every ν, Xν(x−ν) is nonempty, closed and convex,
Xν(x−ν) ⊆ Kν , and Xν , as a point-to-set map, is both
upper and lower semicontinuous.
2) For every player ν, the function θν(·, x−ν) is quasi-
concave on Xν(x−ν).
Then a GNE exists.
Proof of Theorem 1: We divide the proof into three
cases, depending on the form of the market maker objective
piM .
Case 1: piM = Wsoc. Here, we prove that a GNE always
exists. Condition 1 in Debreu’s Theorem requires strategy
sets to be compact. It can be shown that the shift-factor matrix
H has rank n− 1 for any power network and 1> is linearly
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independent from the rows of H . It then follows that the
feasible region of injection is compact and hence the strategy
set SM (q) of the market maker is also compact. Now, we turn
our attention to the strategy sets of generators SGk . Though
SGk of generators are not compact, they can be restricted to
some compact subset [0, s¯] since any equilibrium production
q∗k can be upper bounded by some s¯. To see the latter, first
observe that, if r∗k is an equilibrium re-balancing quantity,
then it is bounded from above since:∫ qk+r∗k
0
pk(wk)dwk = ak(qk + r
∗
k)−
bk
2
(qk + r
∗
k)
2,
and that for large r∗k, the quadratic term (which has a negative
coefficient) dominates the linear term. Hence, suppose r∗k ≤ r¯
for all k. Let s¯ = ak/bk + (n− 1)r¯/bk. Note that, if q∗k > s¯,
then the equilibrium price at node k is:
p∗k = ak − bk
q∗k −∑
k′ 6=k
r∗k′
 < 0.
This is a contradiction since generator k cannot be facing a
negative price p∗k < 0 and yet producing a positive quantity
q∗k > s¯. For the rest of this proof, we shall assume that
SGk = [0, s¯].
It is straightforward to show that our game satisfies con-
ditions 1 and 2 in Debreu’s Theorem. Condition 2 holds
trivially since the generator and market maker payoffs are
strictly concave over their respectively strategy sets. To see
that condition 1 holds, choose Kν in Debreu’s Theorem
in the following manner: (a) for each generator k, choose
Kν = S
G
k ; and (b) for the market maker, choose Kν = {r ∈
Rn | |Hr| ≤ f, 1> r = 0}. It is clear that Kν are nonempty,
convex, and compact.
While the generator strategy sets SGk are constant cor-
respondences, the market maker strategy set SM (q) is a
polytope that is linearly parametric. Thus, the strategy sets
are both upper and lower semicontinuous in terms of players’
actions.
Case 2: piM = Wres. Here, we prove that a GNE always
exists. Observe that any equilibrium re-balancing quantity r∗k
is bounded from above since:∫ qk+rk
0
pk(wk)dwk − qkpk(qk + rk) = akrk − bk
2
(r2k − q2k).
The rest of the proof is similar to that for case 1.
Case 3: piM = Wcon. Here, we construct an example
where GNE does not exist using the 2-node network in
Figure 1. Our construction is based on the following lemma,
proven in the Appendix.
Lemma 1. Consider the 2-node network in Figure 1. Let
piM = Wcon. Suppose a1 = a2 = a, 1 < b1/b2 ≤ 3, c1 =
c2 = c, and f12 satisfies:
a
3b1 + 2c
< f12 < min
{
a
b2 + 2c
,
a
b1
, f0
}
, (5)
where:
f0 :=
ab2
[
b1 + b2 + c(3− b1/b2)
]
b1b2(b1 + b2) + b1(b1 + 5b2)c+ 2(b1 + b2)c2
.
Then there does not exist a GNE.
The following parameter values: a = 10, b1 = 1.2, b2 = 1,
c = 1 and f12 = 2, satisfy the conditions in the lemma and
provides an example in which GNE does not exist.
IV. REGULATORY OBJECTIVES AND MARKET OUTCOMES
Given the existence results in the previous section, we now
move to analyzing the impact of regulatory objectives on
the market outcomes. To provide clear insight, we focus our
analysis on the case of a the 2-node network in Figure 1,
which represents a caricature of the situation in California.
Though simple, this 2-node network is already enough to
highlight significant differences in the impact of regulatory
objectives.
We begin with a case of unbounded line capacities. This al-
lows us to consider a situation where the market equilibrium
always exists for each regulatory objective. Additionally, it
highlights that the behaviors of the three regulatory objectives
we are studying can differ dramatically even in the simplest
of settings. A proof of the following result is given in the
appendix.
Theorem 2. Consider the 2-node network in Figure 1. Let
a1 = a2 := a, 1 < b1/b2 ≤ 3, c1 = c2 := c and f12 =
∞. Then a GNE exists for all piM ∈ {Wsoc,Wres,Wcon}.
Moreover, the equilibrium re-balancing quantity r∗1 = −r∗2
under the three regulatory objectives are as follows:
(a) If piM = Wsoc, then r∗1 < 0,
(b) if piM = Wres, then r∗1 = 0,
(c) If piM = Wcon, then r∗1 > 0.
Note that, even though there are no line constraints (i.e.,
f12 = ∞), the 2-node network is not equivalent to an
aggregated market since the price at each node is a function
of the local demand function at that node.
Our result illustrates how a simple market can exhibit
very different equilibria under different regulatory objectives.
In particular, though all three market maker objectives are
motivated qualitatively by the identical goal of maximizing
consumer benefit; one results in flow going north, one in
flow going south, and one in no flow between the nodes. So,
the exact choice of how costs are reflected in the objective
is a significant determinant of how generators behave in the
market, which affects the equilibrium power flows and system
efficiency dramatically. Hence the market design question is
important in the operation of a deregulated market. Although
Theorem 2 assumes that the line capacity f12 = ∞, our
numerical calculations indicate that the sign of r∗1 exhibit
the same properties even under a binding line constraint.
To further emphasize the significance of the market maker
objective on the efficiency of the market, we compare the
social welfare (Fig. 2a), consumer surplus (Fig. 2b), and
generator profits (Fig. 2c), at the unique equilibrium under
each of the three market maker objectives as the line capacity
f12 is increased. Here, we choose the parameters in the
following manner: a1 = a2 = 1, b1 = 1, b2 = 0.65, and
c1 = c2 = 1; but the qualitative features in the plots continue
to hold for other parameter values that we experimented
with. For the case where piM = Wcon, the gap in the plot
indicates that equilibrium does not exist for those values of
f12. The plots reveal the counter-intuitive phenomena that:
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Fig. 2: Plots of various quantities at equilibrium with varying line capacities f12 in the 2-node network in Figure 1. Parameters
chosen for this example are: a1 = a2 = 1, b1 = 1, b2 = 0.65, c1 = c2 = 1.
increasing the line capacity could decrease social welfare
if piM = Wcon. There is also a clear tradeoff between
market maker objectives: having piM = Wsoc leads to higher
social welfare but lower consumer surplus versus having
piM = Wcon.
The three market maker objectives also lead to completely
different scaling of generator profits as the line capacity f12
is increased – generator G1 benefits from line expansion
when piM = Wsoc but generator G2 benefits from line
expansion when piM = Wcon. This implies that, although
the market maker objective is only used in the short-term
market, it also has implications on long-term incentives to
expand transmission.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this work we introduce a new networked Cournot
model for studying the impact of regulatory objectives on
the outcomes in electricity markets. In particular, the model
we introduce formulates a game between the electricity mar-
ket maker (or market operator) and generators. Within this
game, our main results explore the contrasts between three
natural market maker objectives – social welfare, residual
social welfare, and consumer surplus. The results in this
paper reveal that the design of the market has significant
implications on both the existence and form of equilibria.
In particular, equilibria might not exist when the market
maker maximizes the consumer surplus and the network is
capacity constrained. Further, even when equilibria exists,
the equilibrium allocation of power flows can be completely
different under the three market maker objectives. Hence, the
results in this paper highlight that design of market maker
objective is delicate and needs to be further investigated in a
principled manner.
APPENDIX
Here we present the proofs of Lemma 1 and Theorem 2.
These results are specific to the 2-node network in Figure 1.
Hence, we simplify the notation by defining r := r1 = −r2.
Furthermore, we drop the subscript in f12 := f .1
1The notations f and r in this proof should not be confused with the
vectors in Section II.
By applying the assumption that a1 = a2 := a, we can
write the derivatives of the generator profits with respect to
their production quantities as:
∂pi1
∂q1
= (a− b1r)− 2(b1 + c)q1, (6)
∂pi2
∂q2
= (a+ b2r)− 2(b2 + c)q2. (7)
We make repeated references to these expressions throughout
the proofs.
Proof of Lemma 1:
Here piM (q1, q2, (r,−r)) = Wcon(q1, q2, (r,−r)). From
equation (3), we get:
piM ((q1, q2), (r,−r)) = b1
2
(q1 + r)
2 +
b2
2
(q2 − r)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=Π(r)/2
.
The market maker maximizes Π(r) subject to −q1 ≤ r ≤ q2
and −f ≤ r ≤ f . Our proof technique is to completely
characterize all possible equilibria (q∗1 , q
∗
2 , r
∗) and the con-
ditions on f that lead to each of the equilibria. Since those
conditions on f do not contain the relation in (5), we then
infer that GNE does not exist when f satisfies (5).
We divide our analysis into two cases based on whether
f ≥ a/(b2 + 2c) or f < a/(b2 + 2c). The first case can be
interpreted as the scenario in which network constraints are
not tight.
Case 1: f ≥ a/(b2 + 2c). Here, we show that a GNE
always exists by constructing one. In particular, we construct
a GNE such that r∗ = q∗2 . Note that, since Π is convex, its
maximizers occur at −q∗1 , q∗2 , −f , or f . By using b1 > b2,
we can check that, for any q∗1 , q
∗
2 ≥ 0, we have:
Π(q∗2) ≥ Π(max{−q∗1 ,−f}).
Since a + b2r∗ = a + b2q∗2 ≥ 0, we can solve for q∗2 by
setting ∂pi2∂q2
∣∣∣
q∗2
= 0 in (7), which gives:
q∗2 = r∗ =
a
b2 + 2c
.
Now note that q∗2 < f which verifies that q
∗
2 maximizes Π(r)
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over r ∈ [−q∗1 , q∗2 ] ∩ [−f, f ]. Next, using (6) to solve for q∗1
gives:
q∗1 =
{
a 2c+b2−b12(b1+c)(b2+2c) , if b1 < b2 + 2c,
0, otherwise.
This defines a GNE.
Case 2: f < a/(b2 + 2c). First, we argue that any
equilibrium must satisfy q∗2 ≥ f . Suppose there exists an
equilibrium with q∗2 < f . The analysis in case 1 implies that
r∗ = q∗2 . However, the first-order condition for generator 2
(c.f. (7)) implies that q∗2 = r
∗ = a/(b2 + 2c) > f which is a
contradiction. Hence, any equilibrium must satisfy q∗2 ≥ f .
Recall that Π is strictly convex. The condition that q∗2 ≥ f
imply that the maximizers of Π can only occur at −q∗1 , −f , or
f . We consider each case separately. Due to lack of space,
we only give the proof of the case where −f ≤ −q∗1 and
r∗ = +f in this paper. However, the approach for the other
cases is similar.
Suppose −f ≤ −q∗1 and r∗ = +f . From (6) and (7), we
have:
q∗2 =
a+ b2f
2(b2 + c)
, q∗1 =
{
a−b1f
2(b1+c)
, if f ≤ ab1 ,
0, otherwise.
For this case, we need the following conditions to be satisfied:
(a) q∗2 ≥ f , (b) q∗1 ≤ f , and (c) Π(+f) ≥ Π(−q∗1). We derive
conditions on f for (a), (b) and (c) to hold. It can be checked
that f < a/(b2 + 2c) implies (a) is always satisfied. To deal
with conditions (b) and (c), we consider the two possibilities
separately: (i) f ≤ a/b1, and (ii) f > a/b1.
(i) Suppose f ≤ a/b1. Then (b) q∗1 ≤ f if and only if:
f ≥ a
3b1 + 2c
.
Also, (c) Π(+f) ≥ Π(−q∗1) is true if and only if the
following quantity is non-negative.
Π(+f)−Π(−q∗1)
= b1(q
∗
1 + f)
2 + b2(q
∗
2 − f)2 − b2(q∗1 + q∗2)2
= (q∗1 + f)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
[
b1(q
∗
1 + f)− b2(2q∗2 − f + q∗1)
]
.︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=λ
Substituting the expressions for q∗1 and q
∗
2 for this case, it
can be verified that λ ≥ 0 if and only if:
f ≥
ab2
[
b1 + b2 + c(3− b1/b2)
]
b1b2(b1 + b2) + b1(b1 + 5b2)c+ 2(b1 + b2)c2
:= f0.
(ii) Suppose f > a/b1. Then (b) q∗1 = 0 ≤ f is trivially
satisfied. Also, (b) Π(+f) ≥ Π(−q∗1) if and only if λ ≥ 0,
where:
λ = b1(q
∗
1 + f)− b2(2q∗2 − f + q∗1)
= (b1 + b2)f − 2b2
[ a+ b2f
2(b2 + c)
]
=
b1b2 + c(b1 + b2)
(b2 + c)
f − ab2
(b2 + c)
.
Now, we also have:
f ≥ a
b1
>
a
b1 + c(1 + b1/b2)
=⇒ λ ≥ 0.
By working through the other cases in a similar manner,
we discover that there exists a GNE if and only if:
1) f ≥ a/(b2 + 2c); or,
2) f < a/(b2 + 2c), f ≤ a/b1, f ≥ a/(3b1 + 2c), and
f ≥ f0; or,
3) f < a/(b2 + 2c) and f > a/b1; or,
4) f < a/(b2 + 2c), f ≤ a/b1, f ≤ a/(3b1 + 2c), and
f ≤ f1,
where f1 :=
ac(b1−b2)
b1b2(b1+b2)+c(b21+b
2
2)
. Since the relation in (5) is
not contained in any of the above cases, this completes the
proof of Lemma 1. 
Proof of Theorem 2:
Case (a): piM = Wsoc. Simplifying the expression for Wsoc
in (1) gives:
2piM (q1, q2, (r,−r)) = −b1(q1 + r)2 − b2(q2 − r)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=Π(r)
+ 2a(q1 + q2)− 2c1q21 − 2c2q22 .
Maximizing piM (q1, q2, r) is equivalent to maximizing Π(r)
over r ∈ [−q1,+q2]. It can be checked that Π(r) is always
maximized at an interior point and hence, at equilibrium, the
quantities q∗1 , q
∗
2 , r
∗ satisfy:
r∗ =
b2q
∗
2 − b1q∗1
b1 + b2
. (8)
To compute q∗1 and q
∗
2 , note that there are four possible
configurations of equilibria depending on the signs of a−b1r∗
and a+ b2r∗. We deal with each case separately.
(i) a − b1r∗ < 0, a + b2r∗ < 0: From (6) and (7), it
follows that q∗1 = q
∗
2 = r
∗ = 0. But then we have
a− b1r∗ = a > 0 and hence a contradiction. Hence, an
equilibrium of this form does not exist.
(ii) a− b1r∗ < 0, a+ b2r∗ ≥ 0: From (6) and (7), we have
q∗1 = 0, and q
∗
2 = (a + b2r
∗)/(2b2 + 2c). Substituting
this into (8) and simplifying, we get:
r∗ =
b2
b1 + b2
q∗2 =
ab2
2(b1 + b2)(b2 + c)− b22
.
But it can be checked that a − b1r∗ ≥ 0 which is a
contradiction. Hence, an equilibrium of this form does
not exist.
(iii) a − b1r∗ ≥ 0, a + b2r∗ < 0: From (6), (7) and using
arguments similar to the last case, we have q∗2 = 0 and:
r∗ =
−ab1
2(b1 + b2)(b1 + c)− b21
.
Again, it can be checked that a+ b2r∗ ≥ 0 which is a
contradiction. Hence, an equilibrium of this form does
not exist.
(iv) a − b1r∗ ≥ 0, a + b2r∗ ≥ 0: For this case the triplet
(q∗1 , q
∗
2 , r
∗) satisfies the relation in (8) and:
q∗1 =
a− b1r∗
2(b1 + c)
, and q∗2 =
a+ b2r
∗
2(b2 + c)
.
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Solving these linear equations, we obtain:
r∗ =
ac(b2 − b1)
(b1 + b2)(b1b2 + 2c2) + c(b21 + b
2
2 + 4b1b2)
< 0.
With some algebraic manipulations, it can be shown that
indeed a− b1r∗ ≥ 0 and a+ b2r∗ ≥ 0. This defines an
equilibrium.
This proves the claim in Theorem 2(a).
Case (b): piM = Wres. Simplifying the expression for Wres
in (2) gives:
2piM (q1, q2, (r,−r)) = −(b1 + b2)r2 + b1q21 + b2q22 .
Since piM is strictly concave in r, it is maximized at r∗ = 0.
The resulting equilibria values for q∗1 and q
∗
2 can be computed
from the generator profits. This proves the claim in Theorem
2(b).
Case (c): piM = Wcon. Since f > a/(b2 + 2c), this
corresponds to case 1 in the proof of Lemma 1. Hence,
equilibrium always exists and we have:
r∗ =
a
b2 + 2c
> 0.
This proves the claim in Theorem 2(c), which completes the
proof of the theorem. 
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